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UNITED STATES FOOD LAW UPDATE:
THE FDA FOOD SAFETY MODERNIZATION ACT,
OBESITY AND DECEPTIVE LABELING
ENFORCEMENT
A. Bryan Endres & Nicholas R. Johnson*
The long-awaited enactment of the FDA Food Safety Moderni-
zation Act (FSMA),' the most significant amendment to the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in several decades, provides the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) with significantly enhanced jurisdic-
tion to close some of the gaps in the domestic food safety system.
The enhanced FDA authority, however, will have little impact on the
shared governance system at the federal level that involves multiple
agencies, as the Act does not address the U.S. General Accounting
Office's (GAO) repeated calls for consolidation of the fragmented
federal food safety system.' Rather, the Act perpetuates the division
* Associate Professor of Agricultural Law, University of Illinois, Department of
Agricultural and Consumer Economics, and Director, European Union Center,
University of Illinois. This research was supported in-part by the USDA National
Institute of Food and Agriculture, Hatch Project No. ILLU-470-309. Any opinions,
findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of the funding agency.
** Legal Research Associate, University of Illinois, Department of Agricultural
and Consumer Economics. J.D., University of Illinois; B.S. Northwestern Univer-
sity. Njohnson3@gmail.com.
1. Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011). In addition to introducing Sen-
ate Bill 510, the Senate version of the Food Safety Modernization Act, Senator
Durbin introduced S.654, the Safety Food Act of 2007, in the 110th Congress;
S.729, the Safe Food Act of 2005, and S.1534, the Safe and Secure Food Act of
2005 in the 109th Congress; S.2910, the Safe Food Act of 2004, in the 108th Con-
gress; S.1501, the Safe Food Act of 2001, in the 107th Congress; S.1281, the Safe
Food Act of 1999, in the 106th Congress; and S.1465, the Safe Food Act of 1997, in
the 105th Congress.
2. U.S. Gov'T AccouNTABILrrY OFFICE, GAO-08-212, FOOD SAFETY: EXPERIENCES
OF SEVEN COUNTRIES IN CONSOLIDATING THEIR FOOD SAFETY SYSTEMS 24-25 (2005),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05212.pdf; U.S. GOv'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-794, FOOD SAFETY: SELECTED COUNTRIES' SYSTEMS
CAN OFFER INSIGHTS INTO ENSURING IMPORT SAFETY AND RESPONDING TO FOODBORNE
ILLNESS 2 (2008) available at http://gao.gov/new/items/d087941.pdf.
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of authority between the FDA and the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA), as well as the potential for jurisdictional gaps, overlaps
and inefficiencies.' Part I of this article explores not only the FSMA,
but a second piece of federal legislation, the Healthy, Hunger-Free
Kids Act of 2010,' which inter alia provides support for serving lo-
cally grown food in the school lunch program. Part II provides a
brief update on three ongoing food law issues: the Pelman v. McDon-
ald's Corp.' obesity litigation and associated local initiatives directed
at the fast food restaurant industry, legal challenges to the raw al-
mond pasteurization rule, and an update on the FDA's review of
genetically engineered salmon. Part III explores in greater depth a
series of public and private enforcement actions directed toward
allegedly deceptive labeling.
As in previous editions of this update, necessity dictates that
not every legal development is included; rather, the authors limit
their analysis to significant changes within the broader context of
food production, distribution and retail. The intent behind this se-
ries of updates is to provide a starting point for scholars, practitio-
ners, food scientists, and policy-makers devoted to understanding
the shaping of food law in modern society. Tracing the develop-
ment of food law through these updates also builds an important
historical context for the overall progression of the discipline and
prompts further scholarship on many of these emerging issues.
I. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
A. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act
The FSMA, perhaps the most significant food safety legislation
since the 1938 passage of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FFDCA), will close some of the gaps in the existing food safety sys-
tem, while preserving the historical regulatory divide between FDA
and USDA for meat and other animal-based products.! As described
3. See generally Timothy M. Hammonds, It is Time to Designate a Single Food
Safety Agency, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 427 (2004) (noting inefficiencies and gaps in the
current system).
4. Pub. L. No. 111-296, 124 Stat. 3183 (2010).
5. 272 F.R.D. 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
6. Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011).
7. The USDA is responsible for the regulation of meat, poultry and egg prod-
ucts via the 1906 Meat Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 59-382, 34 Stat. 674 (1906) (cur-
rent version at 21 U.S.C. § 601 (2006)), the 1957 Poultry Products Inspection Act,
Pub. L. No. 85-172, 71 Stat. 441 (1957) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 451 et. seq.), and
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below, this landmark legislation includes several key addi-
tions/revisions to the existing food safety framework.
The USDA, with very limited exceptions,' has exercised exclu-
sive jurisdiction over farm-level production. The FSMA, however,
gives the FDA the ability to mandate food safety measures at the
farm level for fruit and vegetable production' -an area previously
outside FDA's jurisdiction. Specifically, § 105 of the bill directs the
FDA, by way of formal rulemaking, to "establish science-based
minimum standards for the safe production and harvesting of those
types of fruits and vegetables, including specific mixes or categories
of fruits and vegetables, that are raw agricultural commodities for
which the Secretary has determined that such standards minimize
the risk of serious adverse health consequences or death."
Second, the bill gives the FDA the authority to create a system
of hazard analysis and risk-based prevention controls in all food
processing facilities-a safety system previously limited to shellfish,
juice and low-acid canned foods." Hazard Analysis and Critical
Control Points (HACCP), a "prevention-based food-safety system
designed to prevent, reduce to acceptable levels, or eliminate the
microbial, chemical, and physical hazards associated with food pro-
duction,"" is a proactive approach to food safety long advocated by
food safety experts." HACCP places responsibility on the food pro-
the 1970 Egg Products Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-597, 84 Stat. 1620 (1970)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 1031 et. seq.), respectively, while the FDA is responsible for
most other food products under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
8. See Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production,
Storage, and Transportation, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,029 (July 9, 2009) (codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 118) (regulating shell production); About the Center for Veterinary Medicine,
FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CVM/default.htm (last
visited Apr. 1, 2011) (describing role of the Center for Veterinary Medicine with
respect to food additives and drugs administered to farmed animals).
9. Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, § 105, 124 Stat. 3885,
3889-3905 (2011) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 419).
10. 124 Stat. at 3899-3900 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 419(a)(1)(A)).
11. § 103, 124 Stat. at 3899 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 418).
12. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GUIDE TO MINIMIZE




13. See Neal D. Fortin, The Hang Up With HACCP: The Resistance to Translating
Food Science into Food Safety Law, 58 FOOD DRUG L.J. 565, 566 (2003) (outlining
HACCP's seven principles and noting that the goal of HACCP is to "prevent food
safety problems before they happen"); James Chyau, Casting a Global Safety Net-A
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ducer to identify critical points in the production process that are
susceptible to contamination and implement a written plan to con-
trol the identified risks effectively." To that end, § 103 of the FSMA
requires food processing, packing, and holding facilities to identify
"known or reasonably foreseeable hazards" associated with the facil-
ity, including natural toxins (such as Salmonella and E. coli),'" imple-
ment preventative controls, including at critical control points, to
significantly minimize or prevent the identified hazards," and take
corrective actions if the preventative controls are found to be inef-
fective."
Third, the FSMA beefs up the FDA's ability to regulate and in-
spect the means by which food is introduced into interstate com-
merce. Specifically, the Act provides authorization for FDA officials
to inspect and copy all operational records relating to any article of
food that the agency "reasonably believes... will cause serious adverse
health consequences or death to humans or animals" from all facili-
ties in the supply chain (with the exception of farms and restau-
rants).'" Notwithstanding the previous limitation, during an active
investigation of a foodborne illness outbreak, in coordination with
state and local food safety agencies, the FDA may request farms to
identify potential immediate recipients of any food subject to the
investigation." Within the context of a food safety investigation, the
FDA now has mandatory recall authority based on a "reasonable
probability" that a food is adulterated or misbranded and the expo-
sure or use "will cause serious adverse health consequences" to hu-
mans or animals.20
In addition to inspection procedures and recall authority, the
FSMA authorizes the FDA to develop regulations for the safe trans-
portation of food," thereby encompassing the complete post-farm-
gate supply chain (with the rather large exception of meat, poultry
and egg products falling under exclusive USDA jurisdiction) within
the FFDCA.
Framework for Food Safety in the Age of Globalization, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 313, 323
(2009).
14. See Fortin, supra note 13, at 566.
15. § 103, 124 Stat. at 3889-90 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 418(a)-(b)).
16. § 103, 124 Stat. at 3890 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 418(c)).
17. § 103, 124 Stat. at 3890 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 418(e)).
18. § 101, 124 Stat. at 3886 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 350(c)(a)(2)).
19. § 204(f), 124 Stat. at 3936.
20. § 206, 124 Stat. at 3940 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 423).
21. § 111, 124 Stat. at 3916 (directing development of regulations to implement
21 U.S.C. § 416(b)).
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Congress also included a few specific "carve-outs" in the FSMA
to protect certain industries-the most notable being the small farm
and direct marketing exemption. After intense lobbying by small
farm and local food advocates,' the Senate passed the Tester-Hagan
Amendment to the original bill as a compromise to minimize the
financial impact of compliance with many of the new statute's provi-
sions. Specifically, Congress exempted small farms (less than
$500,000 in total sales) engaged in direct-farm marketing (so long as
50% of total farm sales were in direct sales to consumers or restau-
rants in the same state or within a 275-mile radius)." Congress also
included a similar exemption for these entities from the HACCP
requirements.
Finally, § 204 of the FSMA directs the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to coordinate with the food industry to develop
pilot programs to explore methods to more rapidly and effectively
identify foodborne illness outbreaks.' The pilot projects must in-
clude at least three different types of foods that in the last five years
have been subject to significant outbreaks.2 ' Likely candidates,
based on past history of highly publicized foodborne illness out-
breaks, include shell eggs and leafy greens."
B. The Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010
In December 2010, President Obama signed into law a child-
nutrition bill that provides for healthier food choices at public
schools.21 In general, the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 is
aimed at reducing childhood obesity by increasing the nutritional
22. See Bonnie Azab Powell, Tester Amendment Protecting Local Food Production
Now Attached to Food-Safety Bill, THE GRsT (Nov. 18, 2010) available at
http://www.grist.org/article/fod-2010-11-18-Tester-amendment-protects-local-food.
23. § 105, 124 Stat. at 3903-04 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 419(t) (Exemption
for Direct Farm Marketing)).
24. § 103, 124 Stat. at 3892-93 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 418(1) (Modified
Requirements for Qualified Facilities)).
25. § 204, 124 Stat. at 3930.
26. § 204, 124 Stat. at 3930.
27. See A. Bryan Endres & Nicholas R. Johnson, Integrating Stakeholder Roles in
Food Production, Marketing, and Safety Systems: An Evolving MultiJurisdictional Ap-
proach, 26 J. ENvT'L L. & LITIG. (forthcoming 2011) (discussing recent contamina-
tion events involving shell eggs and leafy greens).
28. Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-296, 124 Stat. 3183
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quality of all foods sold in public schools, including cafeterias and
vending machines. To that end, the bill directs the Secretary of Ag-
riculture to update the meal patterns and nutritional standards for
the national school lunch program based on recommendations
made by the Food and Nutrition Board of the National Research
Council of the National Academy of Sciences." Second, it directs
each local educational agency participating in the national school
lunch program to establish a local school wellness policy that in-
cludes "goals for nutrition promotion and education, physical activ-
ity, and other school-based activities that promote student well-
ness."" Third, it requires the Secretary to establish national, science-
based nutrition standards for all foods sold in schools outside the
school meal programs, including those sold in vending machines."
Fourth, it requires the Secretary to establish an organic-food pilot
program that provides competitive grants to school food authorities
in order to improve the nutritional value of school meals."
Finally, the bill contains provisions to improve access to "local
foods" in schools. Specifically, current law allows the USDA to offer
schools grants for local-foods initiatives, such as buying locally
sourced food for cafeterias or establishing school gardens. The
2010 nutrition bill enhances current law: First, it gives the Secretary
criteria to use in awarding grants, with priority to schools that make
local food available for school lunches." Second, the bill provides
five million dollars annually for grants, beginning in 2012." The bill
does not define "local food," though it directs the Secretary to con-
sider "regional balance" in awarding grants, including the "equitable
treatment of urban, rural, and tribal communities."" Accordingly,
the 2010 nutrition bill has the potential to benefit children by pro-
viding healthier lunches and encouraging the development of local
food networks to stimulate economic growth in the community.
In sum, the last half of 2010 represented an unusually active
time for federal legislation relating to the food supply. Although
the FSMA did not accomplish the complete reform of the food
safety system that many hoped for, it did provide significantly en-
hanced jurisdiction to the FDA to accomplish its increasingly com-
29. § 201, 124 Stat. at 3214.
30. § 204(a), 124 Stat at 3216.
31. § 208, 124 Stat. at 3221-22.
32. § 210, 124 Stat. at 3223.
33. § 243, 124 Stat. at 3236-37.
34. § 243, 124 Stat. at 3238.
35. § 243, 124 Stat. at 3236-37.
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plex mission of protecting the nation's multi-sector food supply
while offering key exemptions for entrepreneurial, small-scale, direct
farm businesses. Likewise, the attention on healthier school
lunches, potentially fortified with locally sourced produce, provides
another opportunity to develop functioning food networks and sup-
port local economies-potential bright spots in an otherwise reces-
sionary economy.
II. OBESITY, ALMONDS & SALMON: THREE LONG-RUNNING
FOOD-LAW DISPUTES
A. Obesity Litigation and Local Initiatives Challenging the
Fast-Food Industry
Obesity continues to plague the American public. As the inci-
dence of childhood obesity reaches epidemic rates, lifespans for
children may be less than their parents.' Recognizing this problem,
President Obama established a Task Force on Childhood Obesity."
Seeking a comprehensive solution to the obesity crisis, the Task
Force issued a report outlining strategies to improve nutritious food
in schools, ensure access to healthy food at home, and increase
physical activity." In addition to the policy changes highlighted by
the Task Force, the threat of tort liability from actions such as Pel-
man v. McDonald's Corp., and restrictive zoning or other regulations
on the fast food industry, may provide complementary incentives to
change the supply-side of the obesity equation. The following sec-
tions discuss recent events in the Pelman obesity litigation and local
efforts in California targeted at the fast food industry.
1. Obesity Litigation: Pelman v. McDonald's Corp.
In late October, McDonald's was handed a victory by a New
York federal district court, which ruled that a long-running obesity
suit against the company, Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., could not pro-
36. Presidential Memorandum, Establishing a Task Force on Childhood Obesity
(Feb. 9, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presi-
dential-memorandum-establishing-a-task-force-childhood-obesity.
37. Id.
38. WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON CHILDHOOD OBESITY, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT: SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF CHILDHOOD OBESITY WITHIN A GENERATION
(May 2010), available at http://www.letsmove.gov/pdf/TaskForce-onChild-
hoodObesityMay2010_FullReport.pdf.
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ceed as a class action." In Pelman, a group of parents, on behalf of
their minor children, claimed that McDonald's, in violation of New
York law, engaged in a pattern of deceptive advertising throughout
the 1980s and 1990s-including misleading nutritional claims in
various media and print outlets-that led the plaintiffs to believe that
McDonald's food was "healthy, nutritious ... and/or ... easily part of
anyone's healthy daily diet, each and/or all claims being in contra-
diction to medically and nutritionally established guidelines.""o The
plaintiffs claimed that, as a result of reliance upon the deceptive
advertising, they suffered adverse health effects, including obesity,
elevated cholesterol levels, increased risk of coronary heart disease,
pediatric diabetes, and high blood pressure." The plaintiffs sought
to certify a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which allows class certification if questions of law or
fact common to the class members predominate over questions that
affect only individual members of the class.
The court denied certification, finding that individual issues
predominated on three questions central to the litigation: (1) Is
there a causal connection between a person's consumption of foods
of a certain nutritional makeup and certain health conditions such
as obesity? (2) Was McDonald's the primary source of these types of
products for each particular plaintiff? (3) Did each plaintiff rely
upon McDonald's misrepresentations about its foods when deciding
to eat there?" Each one of those questions, ruled the court, involved
highly particularized inquiries into the eating habits and health of
each plaintiff, and the case could therefore not proceed as a class
action.44 The case, originally filed in 2002," continues to move for-
ward as an individual action.
39. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 272 F.R.D. 82, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
40. Id. at 84, 88.
41. Id. at 88.
42. Id. at 91.
43. Id. at 93-95.
44. Pelman, 272 F.R.D. at 93 (" '[B]ecause there are so many factors that contrib-
ute to obesity and to obesity related illnesses, it is improper to generalize and make
assumptions as to causation in any individual.' "); id. at 95 (" 'A person's choice to
eat at McDonald's and what foods (and how much) he eats may depend on taste,
past experience, habit, convenience, location, peer choices, other non-nutritional
advertising, and cost' . . . and although '[b]eliefs about nutrition may influence a
person's decision in some cases, [it will] not always [be the case].' ").
45. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F.Supp.2d 512, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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2. Local Initiatives to Limit Fast Food Consumption
In addition to the Pelman suit, McDonald's and its fast-food
brethren have been a popular target of recent legislative efforts
aimed at curbing obesity." The last few months have provided little
relief. In November, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors over-
rode a mayoral veto to move forward with its much-publicized pro-
hibition on the inclusion of toys in children's meals that contain un-
healthy levels of calories, salt, or fat. A putative class action suit
against McDonald's soon followed in San Francisco Superior Court,
alleging that the company has engaged in deceptive and unfair mar-
keting practices by using Happy Meal toys as "bait" to stimulate de-
mand for unhealthy food choices."
Things aren't much better for fast-food outlets 400 miles to the
south, where the Los Angeles City Council voted in January to per-
manently ban the construction of any new fast-food restaurants in
South Los Angeles, a part of the city that has considerably higher
rates of obesity and poverty than other L.A. neighborhoods.". The
ordinance defines a "fast food restaurant" as "[a]ny establishment
which dispenses food for consumption on or off the premises, and
which has the following characteristics: a limited menu, items pre-
pared in advance or prepared or heated quickly, no table orders,
and food served in disposable wrapping or containers,"o but it does
not apply to sit-down restaurants that sell equally fatty fare. The
City Council estimates that the thirty-square-mile area covered by
the moratorium already has nearly 1,000 fast-food restaurants, and
that 30% of its residents are obese-twice the rate of wealthier sub-
46. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
4205 124 Stat. 119, 573 (2011) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(H) (2006)) (called
into question on constitutional grounds by Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of
Health and Human Serv., 2011 WL 723117 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2011)); Rules of the
City of New York, tit. 24 § 81.08 (2007) (banning sale of food containing trans fats
in restaurants), available at http://24.97.137. 100/nyc/rcny/title24_81_08.asp.
47. Michael Martinez, San Francisco Overrides Mayoral Veto, Bans Happy Meals
With Toys, CNN.coM (Nov. 23, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-
23/us/california.happy.meals.ban 1_offer-toys-free-toys-veto? s=PM:US.
48. Amended Class Action Complaint, Parham v. McDonald's Corp., No. CGC-
10-506178 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County Dec. 15, 2010).
49. Jennifer Medina, In South Los Angeles, New Fast Food Spots Get a 'No, Thanks',
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/us/
16fastfood.html.
50. Los Angeles City Ordinance No. 180103 (Jul. 11, 2008), available at
http://clkrep.acity.org/onlinedocs/2007/07-1658_ord_180103.pdf.
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urbs." The Council hopes that the ban will encourage "more sit-
down restaurants, produce-filled grocery stores, and takeout meals
that center on salad rather than fries."" The Los Angeles restric-
tions are an example of the increasing use of local zoning and other
regulatory powers to restrict access to fast food in the name of obe-
sity prevention." As initial empirical studies seem to confirm the
link between proximity to fast food restaurants and obesity, more
localities may adopt these restrictive measures."
B. Raw Almond Litigation: Challenging the Pasteurization Rule
As first discussed in the spring 2009 edition of the U.S. Food
Law Update," the USDA, at the behest of the Almond Board of Cali-
fornia (Almond Board), instituted a pasteurization requirement for
raw almonds produced in the United States-but not imported al-
monds." The rule mandates the pasteurization of domestically-
produced raw almonds with either a steam or chemical treatment."
The underlying motivation behind this rule was to preclude the se-
ries of Salmonella outbreaks in unprocessed, raw almonds that had
been plaguing the industry." But rather than saving the industry,
the rule has "largely eliminated the domestic raw almond market
[but] had no impact on foreign almond producers, who are not sub-
51. Medina, supra note 48.
52. Id.
53. See Paul A. Diller & Samantha Graff, Regulating Food Retail for Obesity Preven-
tion: How Far can Cities Go, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89 (2011); Montrece McNeill Ran-
som et al., Pursuing Health Equity: Zoning Codes and Public Health, 39 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 94 (2011); Allyson C. Spacht, Note, The Zoning Diet: Using Restrictive Zoning
to Shrink American Waistlines, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 391 (2009).
54. See Janet Currie, et al., The Effect of Fast Food Restaurants on Obesity and Weight
Gain, 2 AM. ECON.J.: ECON. POL'Y 34 (2010); Brennan Davis & Christopher Carpen-
ter, Proximity of Fast-Food Restaurants to Schools and Adolescent Obesity, 99 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 505 (2009); Richard A. Dunn, Obesity and the Availability of Fast Food: An
Institutional Variables Approach (Mar. 31, 2008), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=989363.
55. A. Bryan Endres, United States Food Law Update: Pasteurized Almonds and
Country of Origin Labeling, 5J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 111, 119-21 (2009).
56. Almonds Grown in California; Outgoing Quality Control Requirements, 72
Fed. Reg. 15,021 (Mar. 30, 2007) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 981.442(b) (2010)). See also
Koretoff v. Vilsack, 614 F.3d 532, 535 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that the rule exempts
imported almonds).
57. 72 Fed. Reg. at 15,022.
58. Endres, supra note 55, at 119-20 (describing series of Salmonella outbreaks).
See also 72 Fed. Reg. at 15,022.
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ject to [USDA] regulation and are still permitted to import raw al-
monds into the United States.""
Implemented under the authority of the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA)," the almond marketing order
sought to regulate product safety through the statutory power to
place restrictions on quantity, grade, size or quality of an agricul-
tural commodity.' This is an increasingly common practice of the
USDA-to regulate food safety through the issuance of a marketing
order under the jurisdictional hook of "quality" control. 2 Initially
passed to benefit producers in their relationship with those further
up the food supply chain, the AMAA authorizes the agency to im-
pose requirements on "handlers" for the benefit of the commodity
producer.' Thus, marketing orders impose processing require-
ments on "handlers" that in turn are passed down to producers via
contract requirements or, as in the case of the almond rule, that
impose added costs on the domestic industry not reciprocated on
imported products. Furthermore, some technological requirements
imposed by marketing orders may have a disproportional impact on
smaller-scale producers and handlers due to the underlying voting
structure of the AMAA and the respective commodity boards repre-
senting producers and handlers."
In September 2008, a coalition of almond producers, proces-
sors (i.e., handlers) and producer-retailers challenged the Almond
Marketing Order in federal court in the District of Columbia." The
plaintiffs alleged that inter alia the pasteurization rule exceeded
USDA's AMAA-based authority to establish quality control require-
59. See Koretoff, 614 F.3d at 535.
60. 7 U.S.C. § 608(c) (2006).
61. 72 Fed. Reg. at 15,031.
62. See Endres, supra note 55, at 122-24 (discussing use of marketing orders to
regulate food safety in the almond and leafy greens context and calling into ques-
tion the appropriateness of this use of statutory power and the potential to shift
power away from growers-the intended beneficiary of the AMAA); Endres & John-
son, supra note 27 (discussing the leafy greens industry's attempt to enact a national
marketing agreement under the AMAA to regulate product safety).
63. See Daniel Bensing, The Promulgation and Implementation of Federal Marketing
Orders Regulating Fruit and Vegetable Crops Under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Act of 1937, 5 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REv. 3, 5 (1995) (citing 7 U.S.C. § 602(2) and
Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984)); Endres & Johnson, supra
note 27, at 240-57 (discussing legislative history of AMAA and intent to protect
growers).
64. See CORNUCOPIA INST., FACT SHEET: MANDATORY STERILIZATION OF RAW
ALMONDS 3-4, available at http://www.cornucopia.org/almond/Almond Fact_
Sheet.pdf.
65. Koretoff v. Vilsack, 601 F.Supp.2d 238 (D.D.C. 2009).
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ments.' The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims, holding that
the handlers had failed to first pursue an administrative appeal and
thereby failed to exhaust their administrative remedies." The court
further held that producer-retailers were "handlers" under the
AMAA." Accordingly, their claims suffered the same fate as the
other handlers.' Finally, the court dismissed the growers' claims,
holding that growers have no right to judicial review under the
AMAA."
On appeal, the D.C. Court of Appeals reversed, in part.7 ' Rely-
ing on its recent decision in Ark. Dairy Coop Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Ag-
ric.,"' the court rejected the proposition that because growers had an
opportunity to vote in the establishment of the marketing order,
they were precluded from later bringing a suit to challenge the al-
legedly unlawful USDA action.7 ' The court noted that the method
for calculating the two-thirds of producers needed for approval of
the almond order-relying on either the total number of growers or
the volume of almonds-readily presents a scenario in which a few
large-scale producers could seek USDA approval for a marketing
order prejudicial to a large number of small growers." Moreover,
the court rejected the government's vicarious representation argu-
ment that because the handlers could challenge the order (after ex-
hausting administrative remedies), the statute adequately protected
the interests of the growers.7 ' As the AMAA regulates handlers for
the benefit of growers, there are numerous instances in which the
interests of these groups may diverge." Accordingly, the appeals
court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the producer-plaintiffs'
claims.77
66. Id. at 241.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 243.
69. Id.
70. Koretoff, 601 F.Supp.2d at 244-45.
71. Koretoff v. Vilsack, 614 F.3d 532, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
72. 573 F.3d 815 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
73. Koretoff, 614 F.3d at 538.
74. Id. at 539. Although raised within the context of a procedural issue, this is
precisely one of the substantive arguments against implementation of the both the
almond marketing order and the proposed leafy green marketing agreement. See
Endres &Johnson, supra note 27.
75. Koretoff, 614 F.3d at 539-40.
76. Id. at 540 (listing examples of potential differences between growers and
handlers).
77. Id. at 540-41 (reversing dismissal of producers' claims, but affirming on fail-
ure to exhaust grounds the claims' of the producer-retailers). A dissenting judge
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As this case proceeds into the pre-trial stage and subsequent
motion practice, it will be interesting to see if the courts will craft
definitive guiding principles on the scope of USDA's authority un-
der the AMAA to promulgate rules with the singular goal of ad-
dressing food safety concerns, or if the definition of "quality" under
the Act is limited to commodity grading, appearance or other con-
cerns.7 ' An expansive reading of the statute would solidify USDA's
authority over food safety provisions-an issue of considerable pub-
lic concern. On the other hand, important governance questions
remain as to whether the unique procedural apparatus of the AMAA
is the optimal route for food safety rulemaking.' But if USDA lacks
authority under the AMAA to implement food safety rules at the
farm level, which agency has jurisdiction? The recently enacted
FSMA provides some authority," but not as comprehensive as some
originally envisioned. Accordingly, the almond pasteurization litiga-
tion has policy implications that reach far beyond the tree-nut indus-
try and may shape the scope of farm-level food safety initiatives for
the foreseeable future.
C. GENETICALLY ENGINEERED SALMON: ONE STEP CLOSER TO THE
DINNER PLATE?
The FDA has moved a step closer to approving the market-
place's first genetically modified foodm-a salmon engineered to
grow more quickly than its natural-born counterparts-but still isn't
sure how the fish should be labeled. In early September, the FDA
would have voted to uphold the district court's ruling that producers do not have
standing to challenge marketing orders and agreements. See id. at 541-44 (Hender-
son, J., dissenting in part).
78. See Endres & Johnson, supra note 27, at 202-15; 274-91 (discussing definition
and application of the term quality under the AMAA).
79. See id. at 292-300; 371-375.
80. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885
(2011). The Act provides authority for FDA to mandate food safety measures at the
farm level for fruit and vegetable production. Section 105, 124 Stat. 3899-3901 (to
be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 419). But this would not include almonds (tree nuts) or
other specialty crops. The FSMA also authorizes implementation of Hazard Analy-
sis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) in all food processing facilities, which con-
ceivably could apply to almond processing similar to the current requirement on
handlers under the almond marketing order. See § 103, 124 Stat. 3889 (to be codi-
fied at 21 U.S.C. § 418).
81. For a good background on the broad regulatory issues surrounding trans-
genic fish, see Rekha K. Rao, Mutating Nemo: Assessing the Environmental Risks and
Proposing the Regulation of the Transgenic Glofish, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 903 (2005).
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concluded that food from AquAdvantage salmon "is as safe as food
from conventional Atlantic salmon" and that there is a "reasonable
certainty of no harm from consumption of food from this animal.""
The sentiment that the fish is safe to eat also appeared to prevail at a
series of hearings before the FDA's Veterinary Medicine Advisory
Committee in late September," though the Committee refrained
from offering a consensus view on whether the fish should be ap-
proved, and instead recommended that the government conduct
further studies on the fish.' As of this writing, however, the FDA is
still unsure about whether to require a label on the fish indicating
genetically modified status-something that would conflict with its
longstanding policy that eschews labeling of plant-derived geneti-
cally engineered food products based solely on the process by which
the food is produced, and would reverse an earlier statement em-
bedded in its Draft Guidance for Industry on the regulation of ge-
netically engineered animals.' Nonetheless, with substantial public
support for labeling (at least based on the public comments submit-
ted to the agency)," a change in labeling policy (at least with respect
to animals) is not inconceivable.
82. VETERINARY MED. ADVISORY COMM., FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. CTR. FOR
VETERINARY MED., BRIEFING PACKET: AQUADVANTAGE SALMON 70 (2010), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMateria
Is/VeterinaryMedicineAdvisoryCommittee/UCM224762.pdf.
83. Documents for the Committee meeting-including background on the scien-
tific issues associated with genetically-modified salmon-are available at
http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Veterinar
yMedicineAdvisoryCommittee/ucm201810.htm.
84. Andrew Zajac, No Agreement Imminent on Salmon Labeling, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
22, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/22/nation/la-na-salmon-fda-
20100922.
85. Andrew Zajac et. al., Panel Tackles Salmon Engineering; One Member Says FDA
Will Likely OK Genetically Modified Fish, But Not Soon, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 21,
2010. See FDA, Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed.
Reg. 22984 (May 29, 1992). FDA, Draft Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling
Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have Not Been Developed Using Bioengineering, 66
Fed. Reg. 4239, 483941 (Jan. 18, 2001). See CTR. FOR VETERINARY MED., FOOD AND
DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED
ANIMALS CONTAINING HERITABLE RECOMBINANT DNA CONSTRUCTS 14 (Jan. 15 2009),
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceCompli-
anceEnforcement/Guidanceforlndustry/UCM113903.pdf. For a more thorough
discussion of the regulation of genetically engineered animals, see Margie Alsbrook,
What's the Rush? An Examination of the FDA's Push to Introduce Genetically Engineered
and Cloned Animal Products into the Food Supply, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 457, 469-73
(2008).
86. See FDA Docket Number FDA-2010 -N-0385, at http://www.
regulations.gov/#!searchResults;dct=PR;rpp=10;po=0;s=FDA-2010-N-0385 (listing
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III. CRACKING-DowN ON DECEPTIVE FOOD LABELS: PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
As food manufacturers continue to attempt to differentiate
their products in order to attract a more label-savvy consumer with
increasingly specialized and targeted labeling claims, the risk of
crossing the line into misbranding under the FFDCA or unlawful
deception under any one of the numerous state consumer protec-
tion statutes correspondingly increases. The inevitable result is a
proliferation of private and public claims against the food industry
for deceptive labeling. In an effort to provide additional guidance,
the government has also stepped in (albeit in a limited role) to clar-
ify or revise labeling rules for specific products. The following dis-
cussion highlights some of the litigation, the pushback against the
government, the development of agency rules to specify labeling
claims for other products, and an effort by a collection of food-
industry leaders to revise front-of-package labeling of nutrition in-
formation.
A. Deceptive and False Advertising Litigation
1. Government Enforcement
a. FTC takes action against acai berry marketers
In August, an Illinois federal district court, at the request of the
Federal Trade Commission, granted a temporary injunction against
online marketers of acai berry weight-loss products that promised
rapid weight loss and protection against colon cancer." Anyone
who has used the Internet in the last three or four years has proba-
bly seen the shrill advertisements along these lines: "WARNING:
AcaiPure is fast weight loss that works. It was not created for those
people who only want to lose a few measly pounds..USE WITH
CAUTION! Major weight loss in short periods of time may occur.""
396 public submissions in response for the FDA's request for comments regarding
labeling requirements for genetically engineered salmon).
87. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Court Orders Marketers of Acai Berry
Weight-Loss Pills and "Colon Cleansers" to Stop Deceptive Advertising and Unfair
Billing Practices (Aug. 16, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2010/08/acaicolon.shtm [hereinafter FTC Press Release].
88. Complaint at 12, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Central Coast Neutraceuticals, Inc.,
No. 10-cv4931 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
caselist/ 1023028/100816centralcoastcmpt.pdf.
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The acai berry, which is harvested from palm trees in Central and
South America, was virtually unknown in the United States until
2001, when the company Sambazon Inc. began touting its antioxi-
dant properties." Bolstered by positive endorsements from celebrity
doctors (most notably "Oprah Winfrey Show" experts Dr. Mehmet
Oz and Dr. Nicholas Perricone), sales of acai berry supplement
products surged from $435,000 in 2005 to $13.5 million in 2007."
Today, acai berry products can be found in mainstream retail outlets
such as Whole Foods and JambaJuice"
The health benefits of the berry, however, are uncertain at best.
Though it generally is recognized as an antioxidant that can inhibit
key enzymes in the body, few medical studies assessing the berry's
efficacy as a weight-loss product exist." In any case, there is little or
no evidence backing some of the most outrageous claims made by
certain Internet marketers about acai berry products, including
claims that the effectiveness of such supplements were backed by
"ironclad, double-blind, placebo-controlled weight loss studies from
the medical establishment."" It is precisely claims like these that led
to the FTC's complaint, which charges five different companies, op-
erated primarily by just two individuals, with multiple violations of
§ 5(a) and § 12(a) of the FTC Act, which generally prohibit decep-
tive acts or practices and the distribution of false advertising of
food, drug, or cosmetic products. The FTC estimates that approxi-
mately one million people have been scammed out of more than
thirty million dollars as a result of the companies' false and decep-
tive advertising campaigns."
Before elaborating further on the FTC's claims, it is worth
briefly explaining the jurisdictional overlap between the FDA and
the FTC on the issue of false advertising and deceptive business
practices. Both the FDA and the FTC are empowered to take en-
forcement action against companies that engage in deceptive mar-
keting of food and food products. The basic difference between the
two agencies is that the FDA polices labeling-including health claims
89. Susan Donaldson James, 'Superfood' Acai May Not be Worth Price, ABC NEWS
(Dec. 12, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Diet/story?id=6434350&page=1.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. A professor at Texas A&M University who conducted one of the few human
trials on acai berry told ABC News that while the berry could potentially offer
health benefits, "[most weight loss] claims that I am aware of are not validated at
all." Id.
93. Id. at 12.
94. FTC Press Release, supra note 87.
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made on labels-whereas the FTC polices advertising." This regula-
tory distinction is long-standing: federal regulation of advertising
began with the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, which cre-
ated the Federal Trade Commission." The crux of the FTC Act's
consumer protection provisions is § 5(a), which provides that "un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce..are..declared unlawful."" The FTC's power initially was lim-
ited, however, to enforcement actions in which there was evidence
of injury to a competitor rather than the public at large." That
changed with the passage of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938,
which amended the FTC Act to designate the FTC as the agency
charged with the regulation and enforcement of the advertising of
food, drugs, and cosmetics.' The Amendments also removed the
requirement of proof of injury to competition; a showing of injury
to the public at large is now sufficient to trigger FTC action for false
advertising of food products.'00
The FTC uses a three-pronged test to determine whether an ad-
vertisement is deceptive: (1) There must be "a representation, omis-
sion or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer;" (2) decep-
tion is analyzed from the perspective of the "reasonable consumer,"
not subjectively; and (3) the deception must be "material"-that is,
the consumer must have relied detrimentally on the representation,
omission, or practice.' The FTC Act defines an "unfair" act or
practice as one that "causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers them-
selves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers
or to competition."0 2
It is clear that the FTC has the authority to regulate advertising
on the Internet, though that authority may overlap with the author-
ity of the FDA to regulate labeling. The Supreme Court long ago
95. See generally Chelsea M. Childs, Note, Federal Regulation of the "Smart Choices"
Program: Subjecting Front-of-Package Nutrition Labeling Schemes to Concurrent Regulation
by the FDA and the FTC, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2403, 2406-11 (2010) (describing FDA and
FTC jurisdictional silos).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
98. NEAL D. FORTIN, FOOD REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 56
(2009).
99. Wheeler-Lea Amendments of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52 Stat. 111 (1938)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
101. Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Policy Statement on Deception (Oct. 14, 1983),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.ht.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
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rejected the idea that regulation of false advertising has been com-
mitted exclusively to the FTC, noting that "[e]very labeling is in a
sense an advertisement" and that advertising can "[perform] the
same function as it would if it were on the article or on the contain-
ers or wrappers.""o Today, the basis for FDA and FTC cooperation
is a 1971 Memorandum of Understanding that outlines each
agency's general responsibilities for the regulation of deceptive food
labeling and advertising." Absent any contrary agreement, the
Memorandum states that the FTC retains primary jurisdiction over
the regulation of food advertising other than labeling, while the
FDA retains primary jurisdiction over food labeling." While the
Memorandum encourages joint coordination of programs and in-
formation-sharing between the two agencies, it emphasizes that par-
allel proceedings against the same parties by both agencies "shall be
restricted to those highly unusual situations where it is clear the
public interest requires two separate proceedings.""
Congress further clarified the agencies' roles in cases of over-
lapping jurisdiction in 1976, when it amended the FDCA to include
§ 707, which requires the FDA to notify the FTC in advance if the
FDA plans to take action against a particular food product that is
misbranded due to its advertising."7 If the FTC takes action against
the violators identified in the FDA's notice within sixty days, the
FDA may not initiate its own action and instead must defer to the
FTC action.' Because the Memorandum of Understanding be-
tween the FDA and the FTC does not carry the force of law, and
because § 707 is the fallback statutory provision in the event that
one or both agencies withdraw from the agreement, it seems clear
that the FTC's jurisdiction can in some cases trump that of the
FDA's with respect to food advertising."
The jurisdictional picture is further complicated by the fact that
the line between advertising and labeling has been blurred by the
rise of e-commerce, as the FDA has pointed out. In a 2001 letter,
103. Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 351 (1948).
104. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal Trade Commission
and the Food and Drug Administration, 36 Fed. Reg. 18,539 (Sept. 16, 1971).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 21 U.S.C. § 378(a).
108. 21 U.S.C. § 378(b).
109. See, e.g., Childs, supra note 95, at 2413 ("The fact that the FDA must defer to
the FTC in a situation of overlapping jurisdiction indicates that, 'where the author-
ity is unclear, [Congress] would prefer the FTC to pursue enforcement proceed-
ings' with regard to food advertising.").
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the FDA rejected a suggestion from a policy group to adopt a formal
rule or policy stating that information presented on a company's
website could never constitute "labeling" as contemplated by the
FFDCA, which defines the term "labeling" as "all labels and other
written, printed, or graphic matter upon any article..or accompany-
ing such article.""o Instead, the FDA reiterated that courts have in-
terpreted the term "accompanying" broadly, to include such items
as brochures, booklets, films, and sound recordings."' By way of
example, the agency noted that if a company were to promote a
regulated product on its website, and allowed consumers to pur-
chase the product directly from the website, the website would likely
be labeling. The website, in that case, would be written, printed, or
graphic matter that supplements or explains the product and is de-
signed for use in the distribution and sale of the product."'
Therefore, some of the deceptive and false-advertising allega-
tions leveled by the FTC against the acai berry supplement compa-
nies likely come within the FDA's expansive regulation of labeling,
which flatly prohibits the use of false or misleading claims on prod-
uct labels."' For example, the FTC alleges that the websites of the
acai supplement marketers: (1) falsely claimed that their products
could facilitate rapid weight loss-in some cases up to twenty-five
pounds in the first month of use;" (2) falsely represented that celeb-
rities such as Rachael Ray and Oprah Winfrey endorsed their
weight-loss products;" (3) baited consumers through "free" thirty-
day trial offers of their products and then automatically enrolled
them in a monthly membership program in which they were
charged full price for additional monthly shipments of the supple-
ments;"" (4) failed to disclose that the companies would automati-
cally charge consumers for additional supplemental products unless
110. 21 U.S.C. § 321(m); Letter from Ctr. For Food Safety & Applied Nutrition,
Food & Drug Admin., to Daniel J. Popeo & Paul D. Kamenar, Wash. Legal Found.
(Nov. 1, 2001), available at http://www.stoplabelinglies.com/complaint/FDA-
Letter-on-Labeling-Food-Products-Presented-or-Available-on-the-Internet.html [here-
inafter FDA Letter].
111. FDA Letter, supra note 110.
112. Id.
113. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(a) (a food is misbranded if its labeling is false or mislead-
ing in any particular); 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (a drug or device is misbranded if its label-
ing is false or misleading in any particular).
114. Complaint at 12-13, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Cent. Coast Neutraceuticals, Inc.,
No. 10-cv-4931 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
caselist/1023028/100816centralcoastcmpt.pdf.
115. Id. at 15.
116. Id. at 8.
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they affirmatively opted out on the order form;" and (5) falsely
claimed to have a "no questions asked" return policy that in fact
contained onerous terms and conditions."' To the extent that these
website statements "accompany" the acai berry supplement as an
explanation of the product-as the FDA has suggested they could-
they would constitute labeling and would technically come within
the FDA's jurisdiction."'
That being said, the FDA has previously taken little action on
the issue of acai berry supplements, issuing just three warning letters
to three different companies in the past four years.'" In those let-
ters, the FDA generally took the position that the companies' claims
about their acai berry supplement products (e.g., that the product
"reduces bad cholesterol," or "helps relieve joint/muscle pain and
inflammation") caused the products to become "new drugs"-and
therefore unmarketable without FDA pre-approval-because they
were not generally recognized as safe treatment of the applicable
diseases or conditions."' The FTC's action, filed on August 5th in
federal district court in Illinois, is more drastic. It asks for a perma-
nent injunction to prevent the defendants from engaging in further
violations of the FTC Act.' Several weeks later, the court took a
first step in that direction by entering a preliminary injunction or-
dering the defendants to temporarily stop selling their products."'
The commencement of a civil action by the FTC under § 5 of the
117. Id. at 10-11.
118. Id. at 9-10.
119. See Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 350 (1948) (holding that articles or
literature "accompany" a product, and therefore constitute a "label," when the lit-
erature "supplements or "accompany" a product, and therefore constitute a "label,"
when the literature "supplements or explains" the product, and that "no physical
attachment of one to the other is necessary. It is the textual relationship that is
significant.")
120. See Warning Letter from Food & Drug Admin. To Guilherme C. Moreira,
President, Universal Taste, Inc. (Aug. 7, 2009), available at http://www.
fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2009/ucml83392.htm; War-
ning Letter from Food & Drug Admin. to Kevin Vokes (July 6, 2007), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformati
on/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/CyberLetters/ucm056937.pdf; Warning Letter




122. Complaint at 23, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Cent. Coast Neutraceuticals, Inc.,
No. 10-cv-4931 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
caselist/1023028/100816centralcoastcmpt.pdf.
123. FTC Press Release, supra note 87.
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FTC Act is one of the statutory triggers that prevents the FDA from
initiating its own labeling proceedings,' so even though the acai
berry websites likely constitute "labeling," it's unlikely that we'll see
any formal action from the FDA against the defendants tagged by
the FTC.
Despite the FTC's regulatory action, however, a quick Google
search of the term "acai berry" suggests that deceptive practices on
the part of companies not party to the FTC action have continued.
Consider a website labeled "Consumer Health Reporter," which
purports to tell the personal story of "Julia Miller," an initially skep-
tical "Health and Diet Reporter" who tries the Fusion 5 acai berry
weight loss supplement and finds-miraculously!-that it helps her
lose twenty-five pounds in four weeks.'" Though the website does
contain the word "advertorial" in nine-point font at the top of the
page, it is clear that the site is designed to mimic a legitimate, objec-
tive news source. Cynical lawyers may be able to see through such
trickery, but less savvy consumers may not.
In sum, the issue of acai berry weight-loss supplements illus-
trates the regulatory game of Whac-a-Mole that often plays out in
enforcement actions against online sellers: shut one website down,
and another immediately pops up somewhere else. As noted above,
the Memorandum of Understanding between the FTC and FDA al-
lows parallel proceedings in "highly unusual situations" where the
public interest requires it, and it isn't clear (especially given the
sheer number of dubious diet product websites on the Internet) that
the outbreak of deceptive acai berry websites is one of those situa-
tions. However, as the FTC action moves forward, the agencies cer-
tainly could benefit from the information sharing and joint planning
that the Memorandum of Understanding contemplates.
b. FTC's Authority to Regulate Health Claims Challenged
A spat over the purported therapeutic benefits of pomegranate
juice has led to a challenge in federal court to the FTC's ability to
regulate health claims. On September 27, the FTC initiated action
against POM Wonderful, LLC, asserting that the company made
false and unsubstantiated health claims about its pomegranate juice
124. 21 U.S.C. § 378(b)(1)(B).
125. Julia Miller, Acai Berry Diet Exposed: Miracle Diet or Scam?,
WEBHEADLINES.INFO., http://www.webheadlines.info/consumerreports247/ (last
visited June 2, 2011).
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and pills.'" Two weeks earlier, POM Wonderful (perhaps seeing the
writing on the wall) filed a complaint for declaratory relief in District
of Columbia federal court, arguing that the FTC has exceeded its
statutory authority by creating a new rule that mandates FDA pre-
approval of all health-related claims on food products.' Essentially,
the complaint alleges that the FTC has informally created a "new
standard" for deceptive advertising claims. POM Wonderful bases
this allegation on two prior consent orders that required the manu-
facturers to stop making certain health claims until securing FDA
approval-regardless of the scientific evidence supporting the
claim.' In the declaratory judgment action, POM Wonderful al-
leges that this is a drastic departure from FTC policy, thereby violat-
ing the agency's own rulemaking procedures, as well as the First and
Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.'" Calling the allega-
tions "baseless," the FTC has filed a motion to dismiss, which is
pending as of this writing.'"
2. Consumer Rights Litigation: A victory (sort of) for Snapple Bev-
erage in High Fructose Corn Syrup Litigation
A federal district court in New York has granted summary
judgment for Snapple Beverage Co. in a putative class action suit
brought by consumers who alleged that the company deceived con-
sumers by marketing its beverages as "all natural" when in fact they
contained high fructose corn syrup (HFCS).'"' The court ruled that
the plaintiffs failed to show that the defendant's actions caused them
injury-a required element of the New York laws under which the
claims were brought.'12  The court had also previously denied class
126. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Complaint Charges Deceptive Ad-
vertising By POM Wonderful (Sept. 27, 2010), available at
http-//www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/09/pom.shtm.
127. See Complaint at 2, POM Wonderful LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, No. 10-cv-




130. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 2, POM Wonderful, LLC v. Fed. Trade
Comm'n, No. 10-cv-10539-RWR (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2010), available at http://
legaltimes.typepad.com/files/ftc-motion-dismiss.pdf.
131. Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07-CV-8742-DLC, 2011 WL196930
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2011).
132. Id.
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certification in the action, which is one in a series of similar cases
brought against the maker of Snapple in the past few years.''
The decision, Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Co.,' illustrates the
burden of proof that courts will demand in consumer fraud cases.
The plaintiffs in Weiner tried to establish injury in two ways: (1) they
alleged that they personally paid a premium amount for Snapple
beverages based on its "all natural" labeling; (2) they claimed that
the price charged for Snapple was comparatively higher than the
prices charged for beverages of the same size and type that were not
labeled or marketed as "all natural."' The court rejected these as-
sertions, noting that the two plaintiffs "had only vague recollections
of the locations, dates, and prices of their purchases of Snapple."'"
The court found that testimony to the effect of paying "$1.79 total,
or something around there" or "somewhere south of $2" was insuf-
ficient to establish the price paid for particular Snapple products on
specific occasions.'17 Furthermore, neither plaintiff could testify that
they specifically purchased an "all-natural" Snapple product despite
the fact that its price was in fact higher than that of its competitors.'
Instead, the plaintiffs testified that their perception that Snapple was
more expensive was based on recollection of the approximate prices
paid for comparable products and that they "hadn't actually looked
at the prices of comparable products" on the days that they pur-
chased Snapple.'" The court hinted that any plaintiff making a simi-
lar claim faces an uphill battle to establish injury, given the fact that
"it is undisputed that the prices of beverages in the retail market
vary widely and are affected by the nature and location of the outlet
in which they are sold, and the availability of discounts, among many
other factors."' The court's decision implies that only a receipt or a
direct recollection of exact price paid on a specific occasion would
suffice to establish concrete personal injury-a high bar for most
consumers to clear.
133. See A. Bryan Endres et al., United States Food Law Update: Health Care Reform,
Preemption, Labeling Claims and Unpaid Interns: The Latest Battles in Food Law, 6 J.
FOOD L. & POL'Y 328 n.107. See also Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329
(3d. Cir. 2009); Von Koenig v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 713 F.Supp.2d 1066 (E.D.
Cal. 2010).
134. 2011 WL196930.
135. Id. at *3.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *4.
138. Id.
139. Weiner, 2011 WL196930 at *4-*5.
140. Id. at *3.
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Nonetheless, the Weiner case stands as a cautionary tale for
companies who wish to market their products as "all natural," for
two reasons. One is the cost of defending litigation: once the Weiner
case was denied class certification, it proceeded as a claim by two
individuals seeking aggregated monetary damages of less than one
dollar (the price difference between Snapple and its non-all-natural
competition). Despite that fact, Snapple still likely expended hun-
dreds of hours and thousands of dollars in attorneys' fees defending
the case. Second is the fact that the Weiner litigation, despite its
eventual dismissal, likely produced the plaintiffs' desired result.
From the outset, it was undisputed that Snapple disclosed its use of
HFCS on the ingredients list of its beverages at the same time it was
using "all natural" labels. Therefore, there was no claim that Snap-
ple hid its use of HFCS; the only issue was whether the company
hoodwinked consumers by calling a beverage "all natural" despite it
containing HFCS. And on this point, Snapple essentially conceded:
after the Weiner case was filed, Snapple began substituting sugar for
HFCS in all of its products labeled "all natural," thereby mooting
the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief.' It did so even though the
FDA has not taken an official position on whether HFCS is a "natu-
ral" ingredient.' So lesson learned: some consumers (or perhaps
their lawyers) set a very high bar for what constitutes an "all natural"
product, and food companies should take this into consideration
when labeling their products.
B. Regulatory Measures to Prevent Deceptive Labeling:
1. USDA adopts new standards for grades of olive oil
In April, amid growing concern that some olive-oil producers
and importers are mislabeling their products, the USDA's Agricul-
tural Marketing Service (AMS) announced major revisions to its
141. Id. at *1.
142. For an insightful history of the FDA's failure to define the term "natural,"
see April L. Farris, The "Natural" Aversion: The FDA's Reluctance to Define a Leading
Food Industry Marketing Claim, and the Pressing Need for a Workable Rule, 65 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 403 (2010). For an argument that the FDA should adopt a rule banning
the use of high fructose corn syrup in food and beverages with "natural" labeling,
see Adam C. Schlosser, A Healthy Diet of Preemption: The Power of the FDA and the
Battle Over Restricting High Fructose Corn Syrup From Food and Beverages Labeled
"Natural" 5 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 145 (2009).
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standards for grades of olive oil and olive-pomace oil."' The new
standards, which supersede standards that had been in force since
1948, took effect in October 2010 and harmonize U.S. olive-oil
grade standards with internationally recognized standards of quality
used by the world's major olive-oil producing countries."'
The genesis of the revised standards was a petition to USDA by
the California Olive Oil Council (COOC), which emphasized that
the 1948 standards, by using categories such as "U.S. Grade A" or
"U.S. Fancy," did not reflect current olive-oil industry standards
used both in the U.S. and abroad."' The COOC stressed that "be-
cause there is no definition for olive oil in the U.S., some unscrupu-
lous blenders can produce low quality olive oil and market it as extra
virgin olive oil, at a premium price."' This point was bolstered by a
study published in July by researchers at the University of California-
Davis' Olive Center, who analyzed a sample set of olive oils on Cali-
fornia grocery store shelves and concluded that 69% of the im-
ported oils and 10% of the domestic oils tested did not meet inter-
nationally accepted standards for extra-virgin olive oil."' Virgin olive
oil, which is unprocessed and is often touted as a healthier alterna-
tive to vegetable oils, commands a significant price premium over
lower-quality olive oils and olive oil blends."'
Therefore, in an effort to define quality ratings more clearly,
the revised USDA standards list eight grades of olive oil in two ma-
jor categories: olive oil and olive-pomace oil.4 9 "U.S. Extra Virgin
Olive Oil," for example, is defined as virgin olive oil that has "excel-
lent flavor and odor (median of defects equal to zero and median of
fruitiness greater than zero) and a free fatty acid content..of not
more than 0.8 grams per 100 grams..." ' Among other things, the
143. United States Standards for Grades of Olive Oil and Olive-Pomace Oil, 75
Fed. Reg. 22,363 (Apr. 18, 2010).
144. AGRIc. MKTG. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., UNITED STATES STANDARDS FOR
GRADES OF OLIVE OIL AND OLIVE-POMACE OIL (2010), available at
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELDEV3011889 [here-
inafter REVISED OLIVE OIL STANDARDS].
145. 75 Fed. Reg. at 22,363-64.
146. Id. at 22,364.
147. P.J. Huffstutter & Kristena Hansen, Lab Tests Cast Doubt on Olive Oil's Virgin-
ity, L.A. TIMES (July 15, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/15/
business/a-fi-olive-oil-20100715.
148. See id. (noting that at one retailer, a bottle of extra-virgin olive oil cost
$14.29, while a bottle of "extra-light" olive oil of the same brand cost $7.99).
149. See REVISED OLIVE OIL STANDARDS, supra note 144, at § 52.1534 (grades of
olive oil) and § 52.1535 (grades of olive-pomace oil).
150. Id. at § 52.1534(a).
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revised standards set forth specific definitions for "U.S. Virgin Olive
Oil," "U.S. Olive Oil," and "U.S. Refined Olive Oil," as well as a
separate grading scale for olive-pomace oil.' The standards list
twenty-two tests used to ascertain the grade of olive oil, including
quality tests (flavor, odor, color, free fatty acid content, peroxide
value, and UV-light absorbance) and purity tests (tests to determine
olive oil origin and degree of processing, if any).'"
In revising the olive oil standards, the USDA hopes that con-
sumers will be ensured "product quality through inspection
and..objective chemical and organoleptic testing."' And indeed,
since taking effect in October, the revised guidelines have produced
some "small but noticeable" changes in the marketing of olive oil,
including increased use of "best by" dates on bottles and the drop-
ping of the "extra virgin" designation on bottles of extra virgin olive
oils infused with extra ingredients such as garlic or citrus.' But the
main problem, at least according to some industry trade groups, is
that the new USDA standards are, as before, entirely voluntary, and
there is no mechanism for agency enforcement of the rules. That
fact is particularly troubling considering that state agencies have
previously found that oils labeled as "extra virgin" (and therefore
supposedly pure) were in fact blended with cheaper canola, seed, or
nut oils.'" This raises not only issues of fraud and false advertising,
but also serious health concerns for people with food allergies.
Some states (e.g., California and Oregon) have passed their own
standards for olive oil,'" but many others have not.
Therefore, private actors can be expected to continue their own
efforts to ensure that olive oil is properly labeled and marketed, and
unscrupulous marketers may continue to skirt the rules in states
without mandatory regulations. In California, the COOC has em-
ployed its own testers and scientists to create its own "certified extra
virgin" marketing label. Olive oils that meet the COOC standards-
151. Id.
152. See id. at § 52.1540 ("methods of analysis"); § 52.1541 ("ascertaining the
grade of a lot"); § 52.1542 ("score sheet for olive oil and olive-pomace oil").
153. 75 Fed. Reg. 22,367 (Apr. 18, 2010).
154. Lisa McKinnon, New USDA Olive Oil Standards Support What Producers Already
Do, VENTURA COUNTY STAR (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.vcstar.com/news/2010/
oct/i9/new-usda-olive-oil-standards-to-take-affect-say/
155. Hufstutter and Hansen, supra note 147.
156. See CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 112877 (West 2011) (setting forth olive
oil grades); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 616.761 (West 2011) (authorizing the Oregon
Department of Agriculture to establish standards of identity and grades for olive
oil).
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which are stricter than those put into place recently by the USDA-
are permitted to bear a sticker distinguishing them from their non-
certified counterparts.' Not surprisingly, the legal system has also
been used to push for truth-in-olive-oil advertising: in July, just days
after the findings of the U.C.-Davis report were published in the
L.A. Times, a group of plaintiffs (led by Bravo TV "Top Chef' David
Martin) filed a putative class-action suit in California state court
against a group of defendant olive-oil producers and importers, al-
leging state-law claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach
of warranty, false advertising, and unjust enrichment.'" A similar
suit was filed in Florida state court in August.'"
2. USDA Issues Final Nutrition Labeling Requirements for Meat and
Poultry
In an effort to more clearly communicate nutrition informa-
tion, in December 2010 the USDA enacted regulations that require
major cuts of meat and poultry, as well as ground meat and poultry
products, to carry nutrition labels." The mandatory labels were
prompted by the USDA's own regulations, which require the agency
to provide nutrition labeling for major cuts of meat and poultry if
the agency finds that there isn't sufficient participation in voluntary
labeling efforts.'"' There wasn't sufficient participation,"' and so
beginning in 2012, the USDA will require producers of a final, pack-
aged meat product to place nutrition content labels on forty of the
most popular meat and poultry products.'' Under the rule, pack-
ages of ground or chopped meat and poultry will be required to
carry a nutrition label.' Whole, raw cuts of meat will be required to
157. McKinnon, supra note 154.
158. Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, California Chefs Claim EVOO Fails to Meet Regu-
latory Standards, FOOD & BEVERAGE LITIG. UPDATE, Aug. 6, 2010, available at
http://www.shb.com/newsletters/FBLU/FBLU359.pdf.
159. Shook, Hardy Bacon LLP, Florida Consumers Bring Fraud Claims Against
EVOO Companies, FOOD & BEVERAGE LITLG. UPDATE, Aug. 27, 2010, available at
http://www.shb.com/newsletters/FBLU/FBLU362.pdf.
160. Nutrition Labeling of Single-Ingredient Products and Ground or Chopped
Meat and Poultry Products, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,148 (Dec. 29, 2010).
161. See 9 C.F.R. § 317.343 (2010) (requiring FSIS to assess retailer participation
in voluntary labeling efforts every two years and requiring rulemaking for manda-
tory labeling if fewer than 60% of all companies surveyed were participating); 9
C.F.R. § 381.443 (same with respect to poultry).
162. 75 Fed. Reg. at 82,148.
163. See 9 C.F.R. § 317.300 (meat); 9 C.F.R. § 381.400 (poultry).
164. 9 C.F.R. § 317.300(a); 9 C.F.R. § 381.400.
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carry a nutrition label either on the package or on a sign at the point
of consumer purchase." The labels must indicate the total number
of calories and the grams of total fat and saturated fat that the meat
or poultry product contains.'" In addition, any product that con-
tains a "percentage lean" statement on its label (e.g., "80% lean")
must also list the corresponding fat percentage.'"
The new rules include a number of exemptions. First, the label-
ing rules exempt products intended for further processing, so long
as these products bear no nutritional claims or nutrition informa-
tion.t" Second, the rules exempt products that are not for sale to
consumers, so long as these products do not bear nutrition claims or
nutritional information.'" Third, ground or chopped meat or poul-
try products produced by small businesses do not have to comply
with the new nutritional labeling requirements."o The USDA de-
fines a "small business" for purposes of this exception as a facility
that employs 500 or fewer people and produces no more than
100,000 pounds of meat per year.'' This exception holds even if
small producers use "percent fat" and "percent lean" labels on their
ground meat and poultry products, so long as they include no other
nutritional claims or nutritional information on their labels. How-
ever, unlike for ground products, the nutritional labeling rules for
major whole cuts of meat or poultry do not exempt small produc-
ers.'" Nonetheless, this requirement should not be overly burden-
some, because USDA plans to make point-of-purchase labeling ma-
terials available over the Internet, free of charge.' Finally, the rules
exempt meat and poultry in small packages,' or custom slaugh-
tered,' or intended for export,"' or prepared and sold at retail.'"
165. 9 C.F.R. § 317.345; 9 C.F.R. § 381.445.
166. 75 Fed. Reg. at 82,148.
167. 9 C.F.R. § 317.362; 9 C.F.R. § 381.462.
168. 9 C.F.R. § 317.400(a)(2); 9 C.F.R. § 381.500(a)(2).
169. 9 C.F.R. § 317.400(a)(3); 9 C.F.R. § 381.500(a)(3).
170. 9 C.F.R. § 317.400(a)(1); 9 C.F.R. § 381.500(a)(1).
171. 9 C.F.R. § 317.400(a)(1)(ii); 9 C.F.R. § 381.500(a)(1)(ii).
172. See 9 C.F.R. § 317.400(a)(1) (exempting food "other than the major cuts of
single-ingredient, raw meat products identified in § 317.344 produced by small
businesses"); 9 C.F.R. § 381.500(a)(1) (same as to poultry products).
173. Nutrition Labeling of Single-Ingredient Products and Ground or Chopped
Meat and Poultry Products, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,151 (Dec. 29, 2010).
174. 9 C.F.R. § 317.400(a)(4); 9 C.F.R. § 381.500(a)(4).
175. 9 C.F.R. § 317.400(a)(5); 9 C.F.R. § 381.500(a)(5).
176. 9 C.F.R. § 317.400(a)(6); 9 C.F.R. § 381.500(a)(6).
177. 9 C.F.R. § 317.400(a)(7); 9 C.F.R. § 381.500(a)(7).
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C. Private Standards Labeling Initiatives
In January 2011, the Grocery Manufacturers' Association
(GMA) and the Food Marketing Institute (FMI) unveiled an indus-
try-wide, front-of-the-package (FOP) labeling system that highlights
key nutritional information about many packaged foods sold in gro-
cery stores. The GMA and FMI, whose members include the vast
majority of food manufacturers and retailers, argue that the new
labeling will "help busy consumers - especially parents - make in-
formed decisions when they shop.""' In essence, the labeling pro-
gram, called "Nutrition Keys," consists of four icons that will be
prominently displayed together on the front of a food package.
Each icon represents a key nutrient that dietary guidelines recom-
mend consuming in limited quantities: calories, saturated fat, sugars,
and sodium."' Small food packages that don't have the space to dis-
play all four icons may display only the icon containing calorie in-
formation.'
The GMA and the FMI say that they have developed the new
standards directly in response to a challenge from first lady Michelle
Obama, who, as part of her "Let's Move" healthy eating campaign,
asked the industry to help consumers make healthier food choices.'
But in fact, the Obama administration and the FDA parted ways
with the food industry over the Nutrition Keys program after indus-
try insisted on retaining the most controversial aspect of the pro-
gram: voluntary "nutrients to encourage" labeling.'" In addition to
the four "nutrients to limit" icon, certain packages could also in-
clude up to two labels that include information about "nutrients to
encourage," including potassium, fiber, Vitamin A, Vitamin C, Vi-
tamin D, calcium, and iron." A package could contain these icons
only if the product contained more than 10% of the daily value of
the nutrient and meets FDA requirements for a "good source" nu-
trient content claim.'" This juxtaposition of unhealthy nutrients







182. William Neuman, Food Makers Devise Own Label Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/25/business/251abel.html? r-i&scp=3&
sq=front%20ofo20package%201abeling&stcse.
183. Nutrition Keys, supra note 178.
184. Id.
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with healthy ones, with no means of differentiation, led one Obama
administrative official to conclude that " 'the label [is] going to be
confusing, because [healthy nutrients] would be included out of
context, and it could make unhealthy foods appear like they had
some redeeming quality...[For example], ice cream would be
deemed healthy because it would have calcium in it.' "'"
In any case, the Nutrition Keys labeling program is the latest ef-
fort by the food industry to stay ahead of pending FDA action to
establish uniform, voluntary guidelines for FOP labeling on food
products.'" The FDA has made it clear that its goal for any FOP
labeling system is to "provide a more convenient and effective in-
formation tool for consumers seeking quick and accurate informa-
tion about the nutritional quality of the food they are purchasing,"
thereby allowing them to make more nutritious food choices and
"reduce obesity and other diet-related diseases."'" What food manu-
facturers are worried about-and surely what they're trying to pre-
vent by placing "nutrients to encourage" FOP labels right next to
"nutrients to avoid" FOP labels-is FDA's assessment that an FOP
labeling scheme that uniformly focuses on healthy choices "may fos-
ter industry reformulation of products because some consumers
may notice the information and make their product selection ac-
cordingly."'" But as the olive oil and Snapple litigation efforts show,
consumers appear to be increasingly demanding full clarity about
the nutritional content of food products. An industry FOP labeling
program that discloses the 12 grams of sugar per serving in Froot
Loops (more than many cookies) while at the same time labeling the
cereal as a good source of fiber and Vitamin C'" may not produce
that level of clarity.
The Nutrition Keys program is reminiscent to the highly
touted, but quickly terminated, "Smart Choices" FOP labeling
scheme developed by the Keystone Center in 2009 with funding
from fourteen major food companies.'o Processed food products
185. Neuman, supra note 182.
186. New Front-ofPackage Labeling Initiative, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/
food/labelingnutrition/ucm202726.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2011).
187. Front-of-Package and Shelf Tag Nutrition Symbols; Establishment of Docket;
Requests for Comments and Information, 75 Fed. Reg. 22,602, 22,603 (Apr. 29,
2010).
188. Id.
189. William Neuman, For Your Health, Froot Loops, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/05/business/05smart.html.
190. Rubecca Ruiz, Smart Choices Foods: Dumb As They Look?, FORBES (Sep. 17,
2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/17/smart-choices-labels-lifestyle-health-
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meeting the Smart Choices criteria could place a green seal with a
check mark on the front of the package to indicate a "healthier"
food product.' The problem, from a nutritional standpoint, was
that although the product may have contained relative high marks in
one aspect (e.g., low in fat, sodium or sugar; high in vitamins or cal-
cium), these scores could offset relatively poor nutritional value in
other areas. For example, a sixty-calorie Fudgsicle qualified for a
Smart Choice label due to its low fat content, but the product had
no other nutritional value and contained three types of sugar-
hardly what one would term a "healthy" product.'" Other particu-
larly egregious examples noted by the media included Froot Loops
and a "Magical Cheese Stuffed Crust Pizza" that contained 23% of
the recommended daily salt and fat intake.'
In addition to engendering significant ridicule from the media
and nutrition experts,' the FDA issued a letter expressing concern
to the General Manager of the Smart Choices Program.'" Noting
the proliferation of competing FOP labeling symbols and research
suggesting a likelihood of consumer confusion, the agency ex-
pressed concern that the criteria used to qualify products for the
Smart Choices label was inconsistent with government dietary guide-
lines, could mislead consumers and could encourage consumers to
eat highly processed foods rather than healthier fruits, vegetables
and whole grains.' Shortly thereafter, the Smart Choices program
voluntarily shut down the labeling initiative.'
Whether the Nutrition Keys labeling program shares a similar
fate with regard to FDA remains to be seen. Meanwhile, the agency
has committed to studying a uniform FOP labeling scheme based, at
foods.html. See also Childs, supra note 95, at 2414-15 (discussing the background of
the Smart Choices program).
191. Ruiz, supra note 190.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.; Neuman, supra note 189 (citing objections by noted food policy experts
to the Smart Choices program); Tom Laskawy, Big Food's 'Smart Choices' label raises
eyebrows at the FDA, THE GRIST (Sept. 8, 2009), available at http://www.
grist.org/article/2009-09-08-big-foods-smart-choices-label-raises-eyebrows-at-the-fda.
195. Letter From Food & Drug Admin. To Sarah Krol, Gen. Manager, Smart
Choices Program (Aug. 19, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/
LabelingNutrition/LabelClaims/ucml80146.htm.
196. Id.
197. Press Release, Smart Choices Program, Smart Choices Program Postpones
Active Operations (Oct. 23, 2009), available at http://www.smartchoicespro-
gram.com/pr 091023-operations.html.
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least in part, on the "traffic light" symbol currently used in the
United Kingdom.'"
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
This update marks a milestone in food law: the long-awaited
enactment of the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act. Although
the Act fills some jurisdictional gaps and provide mandatory recall
authority, it most likely will not extinguish calls for further food-
safety regulatory reform such as the consolidation of food-safety
responsibilities into a single agency.'" So perhaps the development
of food law captured in this series of articles will mean "more of the
same." That certainly holds true with respect to litigation over al-
legedly deceptive or misbranded food labels. As in section III of this
update, the prior version detailed several important deceptive label-
ing cases and preemption issues." An earlier article analyzed the
various "all natural" lawsuits2 0-still the subject of litigation and
likely to continue until both the FDA and USDA settle on a firm
definition. On the other hand, perhaps this is a high point in the
litigation, and the trend in food law for the future will not be more
of the same. Perhaps after courts resolve this round of disputes
there will be more predictability in both federal and state law that
will define for food manufacturers and the consuming public more
precisely where the line is between product promotion and decep-
tive labeling.
Meanwhile, outside the courthouse door, American consumers
continue their push for healthier and more locally sourced food
products that, in some cases, can lift some areas of the country out
of "food deserts" while strengthening local and regional food net-
works in other areas. The normative question raised by many of the
legal efforts discussed in this article is precisely who stands to bene-
fit from them. And the early answer, by and large, seems to be
198. Guidance for Industry: Letter Regarding Point of Purchase Food Labeling, FDA.GOV
(Oct. 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegula-
torylnformation/GuidanceDocuments/FoodLabelingNutrition/ucml87208.htm.
199. See e.g., Single Food Safety Agency Act of 2010, H.R. 6552, 111th Cong.
(2010) (introduced immediately after passage of the FDA Food Safety Moderniza-
tion Act).
200. Endres et al., supra note 133.
201. A. Bryan Endres, United States Food Law Update: Labeling Controversies, Bio-
technology Litigation, and the Safety of Imported Food, 3 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 253, 261-70
(2007) (discussing petitions to FDA and USDA to define "natural" and accompany-
ing litigation).
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"wealthy people." To be sure, nearly every one of the legal devel-
opments discussed in these pages benefits all food consumers in
some way. Consumers benefit from labels and advertising that
truthfully describe a particular food's nutritional content (or geneti-
cally modified status), and they also benefit from regulatory efforts
that aim to reduce the incidence of harmful disease-causing patho-
gens in food. The Pelman litigation and San Francisco's Happy Meal
ordinance are two very visible (if also extreme) efforts to highlight
the ever-growing problem of childhood obesity-in the end, a noble
goal.
The Los Angeles moratorium on fast-food restaurant develop-
ment, however, is a more disturbing trend. It is at once over-
inclusive (it broadly prohibits all new fast-food restaurants without
regard to their actual menu offerings) and under-inclusive (it pro-
hibits construction of a fast-food restaurant that serves a 1,000-
calorie burger, but not a sit-down restaurant that serves the same
thing, and also allows convenience stores that contain shelves upon
shelves ofjunk food and soda). More fundamentally, the ordinance
does not get to the heart of why fast food restaurants have prolifer-
ated in economically impoverished areas such as South Los Angeles.
City council members have defended the moratorium as a mere zon-
ing restriction that aims to reserve space for food outlets that pro-
vide healthier fare, such as grocery stores, but building a grocery
store doesn't change the fact that many people-and especially those
living in poor neighborhoods-eat fast food not because they don't
have access to healthier alternatives, but because it's the only thing
they can afford. According to USDA data, more than 50 million
Americans live in households that sometimes run out of money to
buy food (USDA gives these households the unfortunate moniker
"food insecure")."o2 The problem is most severe in big cities like Los
Angeles."' Faced with severely limited budgets and often inflexible,
hourly-wage jobs, "food insecure" individuals eat fast food because
it's quick, filling, and cheap. A gleaming new Whole Foods won't
have much impact on these people when a pound of low-fat, grass-
fed ground beef costs as much as an entire Big Mac value meal.
Thus, rather than trying to get rid of bad food, state and local
governments might instead explore ways to make good food more
affordable. An increasing number of farmers' markets now accept
food stamps, and in New York, food-aid recipients are given extra
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credit toward purchases made at farmers' markets." Municipalities
should consider providing tax credits and other development incen-
tives to companies that have made a public commitment to provid-
ing affordable, locally sourced food-Wal-Mart being the most nota-
ble recent example. And if cities can't bring good food to their
residents, they can bring residents to the food by taking simple
measures such as establishing bus routes between poor neighbor-
hoods and well-stocked supermarkets,20" or encouraging community
garden projects.
Finally, we could do without the undercurrent of elitism that
runs beneath the swells of the local food movement, as illustrated by
the recent legal tussles over the exact purity of fifteen-dollar olive oil
and "all-natural" labeling on sugary, two-dollar-a-bottle juice. The
goal, as author and foodie Michael Pollan argues, should be to en-
courage the scalability of reasonably healthy, reasonably priced food
items, rather than the absolute healthiest, most organic foods at any
cost-so as to get away from a system in which "wealthy farmers feed
the poor crap and poor farmers feed the wealthy high-quality
food."on The FSMA's exemption for small producers and the
Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act's directive to create a healthier
school lunch program are important legislative efforts that dovetail
with private retailer efforts to further advance the ultimate goal of a
scalable healthy food system. Achieving this goal will take a coordi-
nated effort involving all the players mentioned on these pages: con-
sumers, lawyers, food companies, scientists and nutritionists, aca-
demics and gadflys, and policymakers at the local, state, and federal
levels. From that perspective, the "healthy food" movement has just
begun.
204. Id.
205. Id. (describing municipalities' bussing efforts).
206. Id.
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